SCHEIDLER v. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN (2006)

Legal Principle at Issue

Whether a RICO "enterprise" requires an economic motive or purpose.

Action

Reversed and remanded. Petitioning party received a favorable disposition.

Facts/Syllabus

The National Organization for Women, a national nonprofit that supports the legal availability of abortions and to health care clinics that perform abortions, filed a class action lawsuit alleging that individuals and organizations that oppose legal abortion engaged in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through violence and other unlawful acts. Arguing the activities amounted in context to extortionate acts that created a pattern of racketeering activity, the National Organization for Women based their legal claims upon the Hobbs Act, certain other laws that forbid extortion, and a federal anti-racketeering statute, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The pro-choice responndents sought damages and a permanent injunction forbidding (pro-life) petitioners from engaging in such activities anywhere in the United States, which they believed RICO authorized. 

Initially, the District Court dismissed their complaint, concluding that RICO requires proof that the alleged criminal acts were motivated by an economic purpose, which was lacking here. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (1992). But the Supreme Court held the statute "requires no such economic motive" and reversed the Seventh Circuit, remanding the case for further proceedings in National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (1994). After that trial, the jury concluded the pro-life petitioners violated RICO’s civil provisions, the Hobbs Act, and other extortion-related laws. The Seventh Circuit’s affirmance of the jury’s award of damages and the District Court’s issuance of a permanent nationwide injunction, and concluded that, because all of the predicate acts supporting the jury’s finding of a RICO violation had to be reversed, the judgment that petitioners violated RICO must also be reversed. The Supreme Court again reversed in Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc. (2003). 

On remand, the Seventh Circuit did not order the District Court to terminate the cases or to vacate its injunction. Instead, the Seventh Circuit considered the pro-choice respondents' argument that the jury's RICO verdict rested not only upon many instances of extortion-related conduct, but also upon four instances (or threats) of physical violence unrelated to extortion. The Seventh Circuit decided that the parties had not presented this theory to the Supreme Court and, as a result, we had no occasion to consider whether these four acts alone might constitute Hobbs Act violations to support the nationwide injunction. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the District Court to make that determination. Pro-life Petitioners sought certiorari to review this ruling.