HURLEY v. IRISH-AMERICAN GAY, LESBIAN AND BISEXUAL GROUP OF BOSTON

Legal Principle at Issue

Whether the court-mandated inclusion of the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston in Boston’s 1993 St. Patrick’s Day parade violated the First Amendment rights of the private group, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, that the city of Boston authorized to organize the parade.

Action

The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in favor of the Council, reversing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.

Facts/Syllabus

Since 1947, the city of Boston has authorized the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, a private group, to organize the city’s St. Patrick’s Day parade. In 1993, the council did not admit the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB) to the parade, claiming such an admission would violate their “traditional religious and social values.” 

GLIB and some of its members filed this suit in state court, alleging that the denial of their application to march violated a state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. In finding such a violation and ordering the council to include GLIB in the parade, the trial court, among other things, concluded that the parade had no common theme other than the involvement of the participants, and that, given the council's lack of selectivity in choosing parade participants and its failure to circumscribe the marchers' messages, the parade lacked any expressive purpose, such that GLIB's inclusion therein would not violate the council's First Amendment rights. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed.

Importance of Case

In contrast with the Massachusetts courts, the Supreme Court held that that the parade was a discernible expressive act and reaffirming that “all speech inherently involves choices of what to say what to leave unsaid,” language adopted from Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (1986). Therefore, the mandated-inclusion of GLIB violated the First Amendment rights of the Council.

The Court wrote, “While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government.”