KELLER v. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

Legal Principle at Issue

Whether a mandatory state bar association can use compulsory membership dues to support political activities some members oppose without violating their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association.

Action

Reversed and remanded. Petitioning party received a favorable disposition.

Facts/Syllabus

The State Bar of California is an "integrated bar" — i.e., an association of attorneys in which membership and dues are required as a condition of practicing law — that was created under state law to regulate California's legal profession. In fulfilling its broad statutory mission to "promote the improvement of the administration of justice," the State Bar uses its membership dues for self-regulatory functions, such as formulating rules of professional conduct and disciplining members for misconduct. It also uses dues to lobby the legislature and other governmental agencies, file amicus briefs in pending cases, hold an annual delegates conference for the debate of current issues and the approval of resolutions, and engage in educational programs.

Petitioners, members of the State Bar, brought suit in state court claiming that, through these latter activities, the State Bar expends mandatory dues payments to advance political and ideological causes to which they do not subscribe, in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. They requested an injunction restraining the State Bar from using mandatory dues or its name to advance political and ideological causes or beliefs. 

The trial court granted summary judgment to the State Bar on the grounds that it is a governmental agency and therefore permitted under the First Amendment to engage in the challenged activities. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that, while the State Bar's regulatory activities were similar to those of a government agency, its "administration-of-justice" functions were more akin to the activities of a labor union. Relying on the analysis of Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, which prohibits the agency-shop dues of dissenting nonunion employees from being used to support political and ideological union causes that are unrelated to collective bargaining activities, the appeals court held that the State Bar's activities could be financed from mandatory dues only if a particular action served a state interest important enough to overcome the interference with dissenters' First Amendment rights. 

The Supreme Court of California reversed, reasoning the State Bar was a "government agency" that could use its dues for any purpose within the scope of its statutory authority, and that subjecting the State Bar's activities to First Amendment scrutiny would place an "extraordinary burden" on its statutory mission. With the exception of certain election campaigning, the Supreme Court of California found that all of the challenged activities fell within the State Bar's statutory authority.