WEBSTER v. DOE
Supreme Court Cases
486 U.S. 592 (1988)
Case Overview
Legal Principle at Issue
Whether and to what extent employment termination decisions made by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under the National Security Act of 1947 are subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act or the Constitution.
Action
Affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded. Petitioning party did not receive a favorable disposition.
Facts/Syllabus
Section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 authorizes the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency — "in his discretion" — to terminate the employment of any CIA employee "whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States."
After respondent, a covert electronics technician in the CIA's employ, voluntarily informed the agency that he was a homosexual, he was discharged by the director (petitioner's predecessor) under Section 102(c). Respondent filed suit against petitioner in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), of his rights to property, liberty, and privacy under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, and of his rights to procedural due process and equal protection of the laws under the Fifth Amendment. After the court granted respondent's motion for partial summary judgment on his APA claim, declining to address his constitutional claims, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded. The appeals court agreed with the district court that judicial review under the APA of petitioner's termination decisions made under Section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 was not precluded by the provision of the APA, 5 U.S.C. Section 701(a), which renders that Act inapplicable whenever "(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." However, the appeals court held that the district court had erred in its ruling on the merits.