

Faculty Ideology

Measuring faculty viewpoint diversity using campaign contribution data

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In a [recent survey](#) of Harvard faculty conducted by the Harvard Crimson, 32% identified as *very liberal*, while only 3% identified as *right-of-center*.¹ Is Harvard an outlier, or is there a systematic lack of viewpoint diversity in the academy? In this report, I use a state-of-the-art measure of political ideology to study university faculty, with a focus on 55 institutions of higher education studied by FIRE in its free speech rankings and faculty surveys, including schools such as Harvard and Stanford.

My analysis shows that faculty members at these schools who make campaign contributions can be fairly described as heavily concentrated on the left. This is a descriptive claim, not a normative one. Using the same measure of ideology for legislators and faculty contributors, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren would rank as the furthest-left members of their respective chambers in 2024, yet would appear only slightly left of center in a legislature composed of faculty contributors.

This report proceeds as follows. First, I describe the current state of knowledge regarding faculty ideology, discussing the advantages and limitations of competing measures. I next present my findings and conclude by discussing the implications of my findings.

David M. Primo is professor of political science and business administration at the University of Rochester. Jake Jares conducted the record linkage and constructed the dataset for this analysis. This project was funded by the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, but all conclusions in this paper are the author's, and he had complete editorial control over the project.

1. Hamid, Rahem D., and Elias J. Schisgall. 2023. "More Than Three-Quarters of Surveyed Harvard Faculty Identify As Liberal." *The Harvard Crimson*, <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2023/5/22/faculty-survey-2023-politics/>

Three approaches to measuring faculty ideology

The political beliefs and party affiliations of faculty members are typically measured in one of three ways, each of which has strengths and limitations.² The first approach is simply to ask faculty members where they stand politically. It is well-known that college faculty lean to the left, but what is less well-known is the extent of the growth in “far-left” faculty over the past 30 years. The longest-running survey asking about faculty ideology is the UCLA-HERI Faculty Survey, which since 1989 has periodically asked faculty from a broad cross-section of colleges and universities whether they would characterize their political views as far-left, liberal, middle-of-the-road, conservative, or far-right. In using the loaded terms “far-left” and “far-right,” this question deviates from how political scientists typically ask about political beliefs. Despite the loaded language, Phillip Magness and David Waugh [found](#) that by 2016, faculty members identifying as “far-left” in this survey were equal in size to *all* right-leaning faculty.³ Left-leaning faculty outnumbered right-leaning faculty about 6:1 overall. This leftward shift was consistent across disciplines but most pronounced in the humanities and social sciences.

Nathan Honeycutt [reports](#) that this pattern continues in surveys he conducted in 2021 and 2022. In his surveys, faculty members identifying as “far-left” or “very liberal” *exceeded* the number of *all* right-leaning faculty members.⁴ The ratio of left vs. right faculty members is 6.9:1 in these data, again with variation across disciplines.

For its [2024 Faculty Survey](#), FIRE surveyed over 6,000 faculty members from 55 universities — the same 55 universities I focus on in this report — in what they called “the largest survey of faculty ever conducted on this topic.”⁵ They used a seven-category ideology scale also flanked by “far-left” and “far-right,” and they find that far-left faculty outnumber far-right faculty 16 to 1. Strong Democrats outnumber all Republicans by a factor of 2.5 to 1.

Building representative samples of college faculty members is costly and methodologically challenging. If a sample is not selected properly or if there is significant bias in who responds (e.g., if conservatives are more

2. For a recent survey of the literature, see Shaw, Erin, and Shiri Spitz Siddiqi. 2025. “How Politically Diverse Are University Faculty?” Heterodox Academy, <https://heterodoxacademy.org/reports/how-politically-diverse-are-university-faculty/>.

3. Magness, Phillip W., and David Waugh. 2022. “The Hyperpoliticization of Higher Ed: Trends in Faculty Political Ideology, 1969–Present.” *Independent Review* 27(3):359-369,

4. Honeycutt, Nathan. “The Politics of University Faculty.” PsyArXiv, Nov. 1, https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/dnxqh_v1.

5. Honeycutt, Nathan. 2024. “Silence in the Classroom: The 2024 FIRE Faculty Survey Report.” The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, <https://www.thefire.org/facultyreport>.

likely to answer the survey than liberals), the results will not be representative of the population being studied. For this reason, it is useful to triangulate and combine survey measures with other measures of ideology.

One way researchers do this is by examining voter registration data. For instance, in [a 2022 study](#) of over 12,000 professors in the 30 states that include party affiliation in voter registration data, Mitchell Langbert and Sean Stevens find that Democrats outnumber Republicans by a ratio of 8.5 to 1.⁶ Reassuringly, these findings are not markedly different from what surveys have found. Unfortunately, voter registration data in only 30 states contains party affiliation, and even within those states, not all faculty members are registered to vote or choose to register with a political party. In addition, party registration does not distinguish between strong and weak partisans.

A third technique, and the one I adopt in this report, is to use the campaign giving behavior of the faculty to estimate partisanship and ideology. Consider a faculty member who gives \$ X to Democrats and \$ Y to Republicans, where $(X + Y) > 0$. A quick-and-dirty estimate of their partisanship is $Y/(X + Y)$, which ranges from 0 (for a strong Democrat) to 1 (for a strong Republican).

For instance, using campaign contribution data, a team of researchers [found](#) that in 2016, only about 5% of contributions from all professors went to Republicans, with that figure dropping to 2% for the Ivy League.⁷ This ratio has not moved much since, leading the authors to conclude, “Thus, we can observe that in the past three years, [professors’] giving has gone almost entirely to Democratic candidates.”

The limitation of this approach is that the ratio of Democratic to Republican giving is a coarse measure of partisanship that may create artificial extremism if most contributors give primarily to one party or another (which seems to be the case in recent years). For instance, a faculty member who gives all her campaign donations to a moderate Republican like Senator Susan Collins presumably is not as conservative as a faculty member who gives all his contributions to one of the most conservative U.S. senators, Ted Cruz.

Fortunately, political scientists for decades have used “scaling” techniques to estimate political ideology based on observed behavior. Social scientists Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal were pioneers in using [complex statistical models](#) to estimate the left-right ideology of all U.S. House and Senate members throughout history by studying

6. Langbert, Mitchell, and Sean Stevens. 2022. “Partisan Registration of Faculty in Flagship Colleges.” *Studies in Higher Education* 47(8):1750-1760.

7. Kaurov, Alexander A., Viktoria Cologna, Charlie Tyson, and Naomi Oreskes. 2022. “Trends in American Scientists’ Political Donations and Implications for Trust in Science.” *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications* 9(368).

their legislative voting patterns.⁸ The intuition is as follows: Imagine all legislators can be lined up from left (most liberal) to right (most conservative). Scaling models find the ordering and associated ideology scores of legislators that make the best prediction of how legislators actually voted on legislation, using the simple rule that for each vote, there is an (estimated) dividing line where those on the left vote one way and those on the right vote the opposite way.

Political scientist Adam Bonica was interested in measuring the ideology of campaign donors, so he devised a scaling methodology focused on patterns of campaign giving. Using publicly available data, he constructed a [massive dataset](#), the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME), of over 850 million itemized contributions made to candidates for federal, state, and local office since 1979.⁹ He then used a scaling technique to estimate the ideology of donors and candidates, placing them on the same ideological scale with a measure known as a CFscore.

Roughly speaking, the ideology of a contributor can be estimated by looking at how donors allocate their campaign dollars and assuming that donors give in ways that account for the ideological distance between the donor and the recipient. In other words, a moderate Republican is more likely to make a contribution to Susan Collins than to Ted Cruz. These ideology scores are assumed to be constant over time.¹⁰ [Bonica and several coauthors](#) have used this data to identify what they call “the legal academy’s ideological uniformity.” They find that law professors are “11 percentage points more liberal than the legal profession.”¹¹

Like voter registration data, measures like this face the challenge that not all faculty members contribute to campaigns.¹² (In fact, federal law prohibits foreign nationals who are not lawful permanent residents of the United States from making contributions in connection with federal, state, or local elections.¹³)

8. Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. “A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis.” *American Journal of Political Science* 29(2):357-384.

9. Bonica, Adam. 2024. “Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections: Public version 4.0 [Computer file].” Stanford, CA: Stanford University Libraries, <https://data.stanford.edu/dime>.

10. Bonica, Adam. 2013. “Mapping the Ideological Marketplace.” *American Journal of Political Science* 58(2):367-386.

11. Bonica, Adam, Adam Chilton, Kyle Rozema, and Maya Sen. 2018. “The Legal Academy’s Ideological Uniformity.” *Journal of Legal Studies* 47(1):1-43

12. Some scholars make the mistake of treating noncontributors as having a partisanship score of .5 on a scale from 0 to 1, but this is methodologically flawed since it makes the unsupported assumption that noncontributors are moderates. That would be like assuming that faculty members not registered to vote are independents.

13. 52 U.S.C. § 30121. Contributions and Donations by Foreign Nationals.

Another potential weakness in the data is that conservative faculty may be hesitant to make campaign contributions because they fear being “outed” as conservative, as donations are generally searchable in public databases.

To the extent disclosure has a chilling effect on conservative faculty giving, I would expect ideology measures constructed from campaign finance data will make the faculty look more liberal than they actually are. But of course, if this is true, it actually strengthens the argument that viewpoint diversity is hamstrung on campus by partisan forces. Unfortunately, it is not possible with existing CFscores to identify whether any paucity of conservative faculty in the data reflects a lack of conservatives on campus or a fear among conservatives of being outed as such. As discussed earlier, however, anonymous surveys support the idea that the first-order issue is that there are few conservatives to begin with.

Despite these limitations, campaign contribution measures offer several distinct advantages for measuring faculty ideology. First, donations are a relatively rare and costly form of political participation. Contributors are a much smaller share of the population than, for instance, those who [closely follow national politics](#) or [turn out to vote](#).¹⁴ To the extent that campaign contributions are a proxy for broader forms of political advocacy requiring more effort (e.g., public commentary, community organizing, intellectual leadership), the ideological distribution of faculty donors may tell us something about whether ideological imbalance on campus manifests not only in the composition of the broader faculty but also in its most visible and vocal forms.

Second, CFscores offer something that voter registration data cannot: ideological granularity within a party. Voter registration tells us that Democrats vastly outnumber Republicans on campus, but it cannot distinguish whether those Democratic faculty represent a mix of moderates, centrists, and progressives or are concentrated in a single ideological wing. If a major concern is exposure to diverse ideas, then ideological homogeneity among Democrats on campus may matter just as much as the ratio of Democrats to Republicans. Unlike party registration, CFscores can directly diagnose this.

Third, because CFscores are on a common ideological scale for all 1979-2024 U.S. campaign contributors — unlike party registration choices that mean different things across different states and election cycles — I can make apples-to-apples comparisons between the faculty and the general population and examine how these differences have changed over time.

14. Pew Research Center. 2025. “More Americans get news about government and politics than about other topics.” <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/09/18/more-americans-get-news-about-government-and-politics-than-about-other-topics/>.

Pew Research Center. 2025. “Voter turnout, 2020–2024.” <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2025/06/26/voter-turnout-2020-2024/>.

Faculty ideology at 55 leading universities

To conduct my analysis, I combine the [DIME dataset](#) of over 850 million campaign contribution records at the state, federal, and local levels and around 40 million distinct individual donors with a dataset of 112,516 faculty members at the 55 elite and flagship state universities studied by FIRE in the [2024 FIRE Faculty Survey Report](#). The faculty list was compiled by FIRE between April 2023 and January 2024. Faculty who are not members of undergraduate-facing departments (e.g., medical school faculty) are excluded from the analysis.

I combine these datasets using algorithmic matching techniques which enable me to identify the campaign contribution history of the faculty at these 55 institutions. Specifically, by linking the FIRE faculty lists to the DIME database, I can determine whether each faculty member is a contributor or a non-contributor, how much they give, their estimated ideology based on their giving, and how they divide their giving across parties.

One wrinkle in the data is a spike in small-dollar donations entering the dataset in recent years due to the rise of “conduits” like ActBlue and WinRed which facilitate donations to specific candidates. Federal campaign finance laws require even small donations of a few dollars to be reported to the government, in comparison to donations to federal candidates, which do not need to be disclosed until they reach \$200 in an election cycle. I show below how the inclusion and exclusion of small donations affects my findings.

Propensity to give

At the 55 institutions I study, 30,289 faculty members, about 27%, have sufficient giving history to be assigned a CFscore (meaning that they have made enough contributions in their lifetimes to generate a reliable ideology measure). If I consider only faculty members who gave \$200+ to a particular candidate or political committee in at least one election cycle, the number is 16,253, or about 14%. Among these institutions, giving rates vary widely, from a low of 15.7% (any amount) / 3.9% (\$200+) at Brigham Young University to a high of 43.4% (any amount) / 30.5% (\$200+) at Stanford University. Figure 1 depicts the findings for all 55 schools and any contribution amount.

Share of University Faculty Linked to Contribution Records:
Any Reported Contribution, 1979-2024




FIGURE 1


To facilitate a comparison to the average American, consider just one year of giving, 2024. In 2024, 13.2% of the faculty members in my dataset made campaign contributions of any disclosed amount, and 7.6% gave at least \$200 in the 2024 election cycle. By way of comparison, 3.5% of American adults made disclosed campaign contributions in 2024, with 1.5% giving at least \$200 in the 2024 cycle.¹⁵ Faculty members, therefore, were four to five times more likely to make a campaign contribution than the average American.

Simply put, the faculty at these schools are very engaged politically. Even if these faculty are not representative of all faculty, their status as politically engaged makes them important to study in the context of understanding the politicization of higher education.

The leftward lean of the academy

As I noted in the introduction, faculty donors are ideologically extreme by any reasonable measure. In Figure 2, I graph the distribution of faculty donor ideology based on their entire giving history and also restricting the analysis to “big” donations of over \$200 to a single candidate in an election cycle. The results are similar and show a significant leftward tilt.


FIGURE 2



15. This is based on the total adult population in the United States in 2024. Since not all members of the population may make contributions or make sufficient contributions to receive a CFscore, this may slightly understate the percentage of Americans eligible to give who choose to do so. Still, this figure is likely more accurate than the self-reported data in the 2024 American National Election Study, in which about 15% of respondents stated that they made at least one campaign contribution to a candidate for office during the 2024 election. (It is well known that respondents on surveys overstate their level of political participation.) American National Election Studies. 2025. “ANES 2024 Time Series Study Full Release [dataset and documentation].” Aug. 8, 2025 version, www.election-studies.org.

To get a sense of just how far to the left faculty contributors lean, Figure 3 compares the faculty in my sample who made campaign contributions in 2024 to the population of all individual donors who also made contributions in 2024. From this figure, it is evident that there is essentially no mass to the right of center among the faculty, while this does exist for the population as a whole.¹⁶

FIGURE 3




Another way to gauge how liberal faculty members are is to compare them to Congress. The median ideology of faculty donors in my 55-school sample is -1.02. If I consider only \$200+ contributors, the median is -.95.¹⁷ By way of comparison, Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s CFscore is -1.16, and Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren have a CFscore of -1.14. Figure 4 overlays the distribution of faculty ideology with the distribution of ideology for the current House and Senate.

16. The results are similar if I compare my overall faculty sample to the population of all donors across time.

17. These numbers are similar if I just look at faculty who made contributions in 2024. All measures restricted to \$200+ donors are constructed by averaging the recipient CFscores for all contributor-recipient-cycle triples in which the contributor gave at least \$200.


FIGURE 4



To assess whether the schools I study are outliers, I also looked at the CFscores for the universe of faculty members at *any* university who made disclosed campaign contributions in 2024 and compared those with the faculty members in my dataset who also made contributions in 2024. The results appear in Figure 5. As the figure shows, there is perhaps a tiny bit more conservative representation among all universities, but you really have to strain to see it.

I can also track how the median ideology of all faculty donors (not just those on FIRE’s 55-school, 2023-2024 list) has changed from 1979 to 2024,

FIGURE 5



compared with the overall donor population. The results for yearly medians appear in Figure 6, and for means in Figure 7, along with interquartile ranges. An interquartile range measures the spread of the middle 50% of the data in a distribution. It can loosely be thought of as a measure of how concentrated the middle of the distribution is — narrower widths reflect more concentration. (I will dive more deeply into ideological diversity in the next section.)

FIGURE 6

Median Ideology Over Time with Interquartile Range





FIGURE 7

Mean Ideology Over Time with Interquartile Range



There are several noteworthy features of these figures. First, there is a general leftward shift in contributions among both the faculty and all donors over time. Because the faculty has always been left-leaning, the effect for the overall population looks particularly dramatic.¹⁸ A partial reason for this shift may be that small-dollar donations took hold for Democrats first.¹⁹ However, the trend lines for both the population and the faculty persist even if small-dollar donors are excluded. (Americans as a whole do look slightly less liberal if small-dollar donors are excluded from the analysis, but the faculty data looks nearly identical.)

Second, there is reason to think that individual donors are not representative of the U.S. population as a whole, and that the donor base is becoming increasingly liberal. Strong and weak Democrats are about the same in number as strong and weak Republicans in the 2024 National Election Study, but Democrats gave at twice the rate as Republicans in that data. By contrast, survey and voter registration data for the faculty is consistent with my findings, suggesting that the faculty as a whole are fairly similar to the U.S. donor base today, with that (liberal) base being unrepresentative of the U.S. population as a whole. In other words, the average campaign contributor is likely an outlier relative to the overall U.S. population, but the average faculty campaign contributor is not necessarily out-of-step with the faculty as a whole.

Third, despite the fact that the overall U.S. donor population has shifted left, the interquartile range remains fairly wide, reflecting the presence of some conservative donors. The interquartile range for faculty donors, however, has essentially shrunk to nothing over time.²⁰ What's more, the bunching of faculty donors on the left is evident in the fact that the average ideology lies to the right of where most faculty donors are clustered, indicating that a small number of more conservative donors pull the mean slightly upward. In other words, the figures suggest that ideological diversity is essentially absent from universities today.

18. Thomas Kent finds similar results in a broader study of institutions and ideology, referring to this as “very likely an artificial shift to the left over time.” Kent, Thomas B. 2023. “Partisan Polarization of Trust in Societal Institutions: Causes and Effects.” Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.

19. A similar point is made by Thomas Kent in an unpublished paper. Kent, Thomas Bradley. n.d. “Institutions and Constituents: Ideological Trends Over Time.”

20. The faculty panel's wide IQR in early cycles reflects small matched-contributor sample sizes (1980-1986: N=30-94 unique donors per cycle), driven both by a smaller faculty donor universe in those years and by inconsistent occupation reporting in early FEC filings, which is required for the faculty-matching procedure. Faculty donor N first exceeds 300 in 1988 and climbs steadily thereafter. The population panel, with N > 90,000 in every cycle, is unaffected.

Ideological diversity

As the previous section shows, the 55 universities I study lean very far to the left, as does the faculty across all universities, but perhaps some schools or disciplines are better at fostering diversity of thought than others? To see whether this is true, I plot a summary measure of ideological diversity (the standard deviation of faculty CFscores) for each school in the sample in Figure 8. I also include the U.S. House and Senate for comparison. The standard deviation, like the interquartile range, measures the spread of a distribution (i.e., how far apart faculty are from one another ideologically). The dots in the figure can be thought of as a measure of how politically diverse the faculty is, with higher numbers indicating greater diversity. The horizontal lines around each dot are 95% confidence intervals, reflecting the statistical variability inherent in each of these diversity estimates.²¹

The figures demonstrate that there is significant variation across schools in terms of ideological diversity among faculty contributors. For instance, Texas A&M is about four times as spread out ideologically as Berkeley, and Duke is about twice as spread out ideologically compared with Columbia. Interestingly, though, school median ideology is extremely similar across nearly all schools (hovering near -1). The means are highly correlated with the standard deviations, reflecting how the presence of some conservative faculty is a primary driver of campus ideological diversity.

21. The horizontal lines around each dot are 95% bootstrap-t confidence intervals for the standard deviation. They describe the sampling variability of the estimate at each school — that is, the range of values one would expect from repeatedly resampling matched faculty donors. Schools with few matched donors, such as DePauw, have wider intervals, reflecting the fact that just a handful of additional donors, if located at particular points in the distribution, could substantially change the school's overall picture.

Ideological Diversity among Politically Active Faculty by Institution
(Standard Deviation of CFScore with 95% CIs)




FIGURE 8

Breaking the data down by fields tells a similar story. I categorize faculty using the same categories as in FIRE’s faculty survey. Figure 9 shows, unsurprisingly, that the humanities is the most left-leaning discipline, and business is the least left. However, and importantly, the medians are essentially the same across fields. *Even business faculty* who make campaign contributions lean strongly to the left. The difference in the means between the humanities and business is driven by the fact that business faculty have at least some conservative representation, as seen in Figure 10’s depiction of the diversity of fields.

FIGURE 9




FIGURE 10





FIGURE 11



Importantly, the least ideologically diverse and most left-leaning fields are also the most politically active. Figure 11 shows that faculty in the most liberal field — the humanities — give at a much higher rate (over 35% of faculty give) compared with relatively less liberal fields like business (a little over 25% give).

Conclusion

The results I present in this paper raise serious concerns about viewpoint diversity in academia, and they are consistent with findings from previous studies using different methodologies. Faculty donors are very liberal, and the least ideologically diverse fields contain the most donors. And, even relatively less liberal fields like business are still dominated by liberals. The fact that alternative methods, ranging from surveys to voter registration to campaign finance, point us to the same general pattern in the data increases confidence in the robustness of the findings.

Some might say that this is a “Donald Trump effect,” and certainly contribution shares to Republicans drop post-2016 (see Kaurov et al., 2022). But remember, the DIME data includes all contributions since 1979 to create a summary measure. In addition, as Kaurov et al. (2022) show, faculty giving to Republicans hovered around 10% in 2004 — the year *The Apprentice* premiered — and is hardly evidence of a previously diverse faculty.

Regardless of one’s political views, the lack of ideological diversity in academia should be of concern for the broader enterprise of higher education. Scholars have raised concerns that the quality of higher education both in terms of [scientific progress](#)²² and the [classroom experience](#)²³ is hindered by a lack of viewpoint diversity. Scientists who view the world through the same ideological lens are, all else equal, not going to push the boundaries of knowledge in the same way that a group of diverse thinkers will. Similarly, students are likely to receive a different sort of educational experience — especially in the humanities and social sciences — if they never encounter a conservative professor in four years of study. This lack of ideological diversity may be starting to have an impact on universities’ appeal. Just this year, in a new approach to [ranking colleges](#), the Manhattan Institute considered the balance of faculty giving (alongside survey data) to measure “faculty ideological pluralism.”²⁴

This lack of political diversity has also created an opening for attacks on higher education from politicians and an associated [polarization of attitudes toward higher education](#).²⁵ These attacks are sometimes unfair, but they are not created out of whole cloth. I hope that this report opens the door to productive conversations about how to improve viewpoint diversity without jeopardizing the amazing research and teaching that occurs in higher education.

22. Duarte, José L., et al. 2015. “Political Diversity Will Improve Social Psychological Science.” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 38:e130.

23. Shields, Jon A., Yuval Avner, and Stephanie Muravchik. 2025. “Closed Classrooms? An Analysis of College Syllabi on Contentious Issues.” Working Paper.

24. Manhattan Institute. 2025. “College Rankings,” <https://collegerankings.city-journal.org/>

25. Pew Research Center. 2019. “The Growing Partisan Divide in Views of Higher Education.” <https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2019/08/19/the-growing-partisan-divide-in-views-of-higher-education-2/>



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